Strengthening US–UK defence cooperation in space: findings and five recommendations.
The situation
- Space is already a contested warfighting domain. The UK's Space Command reports Russia jamming British military satellites "on a reasonably persistent basis". The US Space Force reports Chinese satellites rehearsing "dogfighting" manoeuvres.
- China is the pacing threat. It has more than 1,189 satellites in orbit, 510+ of them ISR-capable, and it refuelled satellites in geostationary orbit for the first time in 2025.
- The US is mobilising at scale. The FY2027 request seeks more than $126bn for national security space, double FY2026. Scale alone does not deliver resilience, attribution or legitimacy; allies help supply those.
Key findings
- The UK is America's most operationally integrated space ally. A founding member of the Combined Space Operations initiative and Operation OLYMPIC DEFENDER. In September 2025, US and UK Space Commands conducted their first combined on-orbit proximity operation. The UK hosts one of three DARC deep-space radar sites under AUKUS.
- The UK's growing niches have direct military value: space logistics (inspection, servicing and debris removal), space domain awareness, and space-weather forecasting for force protection.
- The frictions are fixable: some technologies are still excluded from the AUKUS ITAR exemption, a US–UK launch and re-entry licensing treaty is still under negotiation, DARC faces planning delay in Wales, and the US–UK Technology Prosperity Deal is paused.
Five recommendations for US policymakers
| # | Recommendation | Levers |
|---|---|---|
| 1 | Build an allied space-logistics capability. Run combined US–UK demonstrations of inspection, refuelling, repair and debris removal, so allied satellites can be sustained and replaced faster than adversaries can degrade them. | NDAA report language; Space Force and DARPA programme direction |
| 2 | Protect and integrate DARC across all three sites (Texas, Wales, Australia) for continuous 360° deep-space surveillance, and deepen shared catalogue and attribution data. | Appropriations (FY27 DARC request ~$442m); NDAA reporting |
| 3 | Explore allied contributions to Golden Dome in sensing, space domain awareness and data analytics, under appropriate agreements. | Armed Services oversight; DoD study requirement |
| 4 | Remove friction from defence-space trade: review the AUKUS Excluded Technology List for low-risk space items, and conclude the US–UK launch and re-entry licensing treaty. | Foreign Affairs oversight of ITAR; treaty consideration |
| 5 | Secure the cislunar frontier together. Pair NASA's Moon Base with joint cislunar domain awareness, space-weather support and US–UK leadership on deconfliction norms under the Artemis Accords. | NASA and NDAA provisions; State engagement |
Bottom line: the US brings unmatched scale, launch and budget. The UK brings trusted operational integration, specialist capabilities and diplomatic weight. Combined, they deter more credibly and recover faster than either alone, largely within existing budgets.
Contents of the full report
- The Threat Landscape
- Global Space Infrastructure at a Glance
- United States Defence Space Posture
- United Kingdom Defence Space Posture
- The Alliance Architecture Today
Numbered references to public sources are listed in full in the report.
Published under the institute's former name, FJRResearch. Compiled entirely from publicly available sources.